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Class Certification in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: A Longitudinal Study 
  Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang† 
  Forthcoming in Law & Contemporary Problems 
   Abstract 
  There is a vast literature on the modern class action, but little of it is informed by 
systematic empirical data. Mindful both that there have been few Supreme Court class 
certification decisions and that they may not provide an accurate picture of class action 
jurisprudence, let alone class action activity, over time, we created a comprehensive data set of 
class certification decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals consisting of all precedential 
panel decisions addressing whether a class should be certified from 1966 through 2017, and of 
nonprecedential panel decisions from 2002 through 2017. 
 
In Section I, through a literature review, we identify both prior empirical scholarship and 
commonly asserted claims concerning federal class action activity and jurisprudence over time. 
In Section II we present our data and explore the light they shed on questions that have been 
raised, and assertions that have been made, about class action certification decisions in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals. Our findings show that, contrary to conventional expectations, in the period 
since Wal-Mart and Comcast, plaintiffs have been winning certification appeals more frequently 
than they were formerly, and Rule 23(f) contributed to this recent success.  This growth in pro-
certification outcomes occurred on both Democratic- and Republican-Majority panels.   
  
We find that final-judgment appeals, at least in precedential decisions, played a larger 
role in this landscape prior to Rule 23(f) than has often been asserted or assumed, and that in all 
decisions since 2002 they continue to play a major role. We also find that final-judgment appeals 
involving (b)(3) issues are common among appeals, which casts doubt on the conventional 
wisdom concerning the class certification decision as the “death knell” for plaintiffs or 
defendants in such cases.  
 
We find significant variation over time in appeal outcomes under Rule 23(f), with 
defendants far more successful than plaintiffs prior to Wal-Mart and Comcast, and relative 
parity after.  This variation suggests the hazards of generalizing about operation of that rule 
from experience in any particular period.  Our models also show that, for reasons about which 
we can only speculate, interlocutory appeals since around 2000 have elicited more ideological 






Think of the class action as a wounded beast – limited in its range of motion, yet 
dangerous to those within its reach. This image emerges from some of the most 
significant developments in class action law and practice over the past several years. 
Plaintiffs’ and defendants’ class action lawyers frequently debate the continued vitality of 
class action practice, the former decrying their setbacks, the latter reveling in their 
victories, and both sides determined to fight on. Academics sift through the rubble of 
class action jurisprudence attempting to discern patterns and to predict what lies ahead. 
Judges struggle to apply conflicting precedents and fill in gaps, at times reluctantly 
surrendering to rigid pronouncements from on high.1 
 
Introduction 
We are honored to participate in this issue dedicated to the memory of Francis 
McGovern. One of us had the pleasure of knowing Francis for decades and of watching him in 
action in some of the many, quite different, roles in which he excelled. Indeed, Francis’s career 
in the theory and practice of ADR is compelling evidence against the notions that the field is 
epistemically shallow and that it offers second-class justice (both of which seemed plausible in 
1984, when one of us, as Chair of the AALS Section of Civil Procedure, solicited Owen Fiss to 
write the paper that became Against Settlement2). As others have observed, and as was evident to 
anyone who watched Francis in action, he was at the same time creative and committed to 
evidence-based solutions. Aspiring to live up to his example in those respects, we offer a paper 
that is part of a larger body of work which seeks to deploy the insights of multiple disciplines, 
and a multi-method research strategy, to cast light on, and dispel myths about, litigation 
procedure. Fittingly, our subject is class actions. 
 
© Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang 2021 
† Stephen B. Burbank is David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice at the 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. Sean Farhang is Elizabeth Josselyn Boalt 
Professor of Law, and Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, at the University of 
California, Berkeley. Christina Crowley, Berkeley Law Class of 2020, Rhochelle Krawetz, Penn 
Law Class of 2021, Tracy Nelson, Yale Law Class of 2019, and Seth Rosenberg, Penn Law 
Class of 2022, provided excellent research assistance. Robert Klonoff and David Marcus offered 
very helpful comments and questions on a draft. 
1 Donald R. Frederico, The Arc of Class Actions: A View from the Trenches, 32 LOY. CONS. L. 
REV. 266, 266 (2020). 
2 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). See Owen M. Fiss, The History 
of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273, 1276 (2009) (recounting origins of the article).  
3 
 
 There is a vast literature on the modern class action, but little of it is informed by 
systematic empirical data.3 In the absence of such data, commentators seeking to characterize 
trends in class action activity or class action jurisprudence often seemingly rely on their sense of 
the lay of the land, citing decisions that support their view.4 These characterizations sometimes 
sweep broadly, ignoring possible differences among courts deciding class certification issues. 
Moreover, they are necessarily the children of the times when they were made and thus, even if 
accurate for the period characterized, may no longer be accurate.  In this paper we present the 
first longitudinal picture of class certification on the U.S. Courts of Appeals.   
 
In earlier empirical work we traced the legal movement among conservative activists, 
business groups, and the Republican party, from the first Reagan administration through 2014, to 
retrench existing opportunities and incentives to enforce federal rights through private lawsuits.  
We found that among federal lawmakers the Supreme Court proved most effective in changing 
legal rules salient to private enforcement.5  We also found that in the mid- to late-1990s, in 
private enforcement cases in general and Federal Rules decisions in particular, the Court became 
increasingly likely to rule in an anti-plaintiff direction and the justices’ voting behavior became 
increasingly ideologically polarized.6  
 
When we examined the role of the Court in retrenchment of class actions in particular,7 
the picture that emerged was at times consistent with the larger canvases we painted. Yet, 
 
3 See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, Class Certification: Findings from Federal 
Question Cases, 2003-07, 80 U. CINN. L. REV. 315, 339 (2011) (“There have been very few 
empirical studies of class actions in general”); id. at 330; Jonah B. Gelbach & Deborah R. 
Hensler, What We Don’t Know About Class Actions But Hope to Know Soon, 87 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 65, 67 (2018) (“[I]t is remarkable how few basic facts about class actions we actually 
know.”); Deborah R. Hensler, Happy Fiftieth Anniversary, Rule 23! Shouldn’t We Know You 
Better After All This Time?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1605 (2017) (“[W]e face a virtual absence 
of even the most basic information on how class actions operate in federal and state courts.”). 
4 But not always. For an illuminating qualitative empirical study of class actions, see DEBORAH 
R. HENSLER, ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 
(2000). 
5 See  STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 130 (2017). 
 
6 See id. at 153-55, 175-76. 
 
7 See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against 
Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2017). Although our criteria in creating the 
Supreme Court data set specified that decisions in Federal Rules cases should turn on 




although the Court was generally pro-private enforcement, both in general and in all Federal 
Rules cases, in the 1960s and 1970s,8 that was not the tenor of its early class action decisions.9 In 
addition, although the Court’s class action jurisprudence seemed to align with the anti-plaintiff 
movement and growing polarization in its other private enforcement decisions starting around 
1995, toward the end of the study period (2014) the Court issued a number of decisions rejecting 
positions advanced by advocates of retrenchment.  
 
The growing polarization between conservative and liberal justices that we found in our 
retrenchment studies, which was greatest in Federal Rules cases,10 is akin to that which other 
scholars have found in studying the Court’s business decisions.11 This is not surprising given that 
in recent decades disputes involving business have dominated its Federal Rules private 
enforcement cases.12 In our prior work, we suggested that the speculative explanation for the 
phenomenon offered by other scholars in business cases may also apply in Federal Rules cases: 
liberal justices in the minority reacted to their conservative colleagues in the majority pushing 
the envelope in the pro-business/anti-private enforcement direction in cases where the arguments 
for doing so were ever more contestable.13  
 
From this perspective, it would not be surprising if interest groups and defendants 
seeking retrenchment in Federal Rules cases, which have become much more active in filing 
amicus briefs in recent decades,14 having enjoyed success before, continued to push the 
envelope. Nor would it be surprising if such efforts occasionally caused conservative judges and 
justices to refuse to go further. A leading scholar of class actions has suggested that some of the 
Supreme Court’s and circuit courts’ recent pro-class action decisions (and denials of certiorari) 
 
incentives for private enforcement,  we also included cases that turned on an issue explicitly 
linked to the policies underpinning Rule 23. See id. at 1517. 
 
8 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 5, at 152-155 (all private enforcement cases); id. at 173-
75 (Federal Rules cases). 
9 See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 7, at 1520 (“From 1969 … through the end of the 1970s, 
the clear preponderance of outcomes was anti-class action.”). 
10 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 5, at 175. 
11 See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the 
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1470 (2013). 
12 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 5, at 176. 
13 See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 7, at 1521-22. 
14 See id. at 1524-26. 
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can be regarded as backlash against “overly aggressive advocacy by defendants.”15 Perhaps so, 
although they may simply serve as another reminder that ideology alone cannot explain judicial 
decisions: the law itself, as courts understand it, constrains judicial independence. 
 
Our prior work thus sought to fill only a small part of the empirical vacuum about class 
actions in the federal courts by gathering and analyzing data on the Supreme Court’s class action 
decisions that are salient to private enforcement of federal law. But the Court decides few such 
cases, and there have been long periods when the lower federal courts were left to fend for 
themselves.  Moreover, until recently, very few of the Court’s class action decisions concerned 
the standards for class certification.16  The centrality to private enforcement of the legal question 
whether class certification is appropriate under Rule 23 has long been obvious. The paucity of 
decisions on certification should serve as a caution against the tendency, common among 
academics, to attribute legal change to the Court. Empirical research has revealed that the lower 
courts may not wait for the Supreme Court to do what they think needs to be done. That was 
true, for example, with summary judgment.17  
 
Sometimes, but only sometimes, the Court leads. Sometimes it follows. The press of 
other business for the limited spaces on a small docket not only means that there may be long 
intervals between the Court’s decisions in a discrete area. It also means that the Court lacks the 
resources regularly to police compliance with those decisions it does make.  Differences in the 
 
15 Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions Part II: A Respite from the Decline, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 971, 
974 (2017); see id. at 981 (suggesting that the Court has “become numb” to the “blackmail 
pressure to settle” argument and that “the business community has suffered a lack of credibility 
in its amicus strategy”); id. at 991 (noting that “defendants had virtually no success in selling 
their interpretation of Comcast to the circuits”); id. at 992 (observing that “the impact of Dukes 
has been less profound than one might have predicted when it was decided in 2011”). Professor 
Klonoff described these developments as “a welcome change from years of court decisions 
curtailing class actions.” Id. at 975.  Compare Andrew J. Trask, Reactions to Wal-Mart v. Dukes: 
Litigation Strategy and Legal Change, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 791, 816 (2013) (“The Dukes opinion 
is not so much a rollback as a correction in a constantly shifting game, in which both plaintiff 
and defense lawyers are arguing for new applications of class action rules”). 
16 Between 1969 and 1982, the Court decided seventeen cases involving either an interpretation 
of Rule 23 or consideration of the policies underlying Rule 23, not one of which required 
decision of a certification issue. It decided the first such case in 1982 (Falcon), the second in 
1997 (Amchem), and the third in 1999 (Ortiz). There followed another long interval before the 
Court finally paid sustained attention to certification issues, commencing in 2010 (Shady Grove).  
17 See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil 




forces that shape case selection by the Supreme Court and the docket of the Courts of Appeals 
can explain why there may be little discernible relationship between empirical trends at different 
levels of the federal judicial hierarchy. Other possible reasons include institutional differences 
that constrain or enhance the ability of judges to wield influence and the fact that both panels and 
circuits may have policy preferences and institutional concerns that are not aligned with the 
Supreme Court. 
 
Mindful both that there were few Supreme Court class certification decisions in our 
earlier studies and that, for the reasons just adumbrated (or other reasons), they may not provide 
an accurate picture of class action jurisprudence, let alone class action activity, over time, we 
launched a project to fill a larger part of the empirical vacuum. To that end, we created a 
comprehensive data set of class certification decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals.  
 
The first article to emerge from this project explored the association between the party of 
appointing president, gender and race of Court of Appeals judges and votes and outcomes on 
class certification issues.18  We found that the ideological composition of the panel (proxied by 
the party of the appointing president) has a very strong association with certification outcomes, 
with all-Democratic panels having dramatically higher rates of certification than all-Republican 
panels—nearly triple in about the past twenty years.  We also found that the presence of one 
African American on a panel, and the presence of two females (but not one), is associated with 
pro-certification outcomes.  Except for splitting the data into two roughly equivalent time periods 
in some of our models, this article did not seek to identify trends in appellate class certification 
activity or law over time. 
 
We now turn to that endeavor. In Section I, through a literature review, we identify both 
prior empirical scholarship and commonly asserted claims concerning federal class action 
activity and jurisprudence over time. These ground some of the propositions that we test with our 
data.  Descriptive presentations of those data suggested additional propositions that might 
usefully be tested. 
 
In Section II we present our data and explore the light they shed on questions that have 
been raised, and assertions that have been made, about class action certification decisions in the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals. Our findings suggest that final-judgment appeals, at least in precedential 
decisions, played a larger role in this landscape prior to Rule 23(f) than has often been asserted 
or assumed, and that in all decisions since 2002 they continue to play a major role. We also find 
that final-judgment appeals involving (b)(3) issues are common, which casts doubt on the 
 
18 See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Politics, Identity, and Class Certification on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 119 MICH. L. REV. 231 (2020). 
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conventional wisdom concerning the class certification decision as the “death knell” for plaintiffs 
or defendants.  
 
Our findings of significant variation over time in appeal outcomes post-Rule 23(f) 
suggest the hazards of generalizing experience under that rule in any particular period, and they 
demonstrate that, for reasons about which we can only speculate, interlocutory appeals since 
2000 have elicited more ideological behavior, leading to greater polarization. Finally, our 
findings show that, contrary to conventional expectations, in the period since Walmart and 
Comcast, plaintiffs have been winning certification appeals more frequently than they were 
formerly, and Rule 23(f) contributed to this recent success. 
 
I. The Existing Literature: Data and Claims 
 
A. Rule 23(f) 
 
Studies of the class action decisions of the Courts of Appeals that are based on 
systematically collected data have focused on Rule 23(f).19 This provision authorizes a party who 
has suffered an adverse decision on a motion for class certification to petition for interlocutory 
review of that decision, and it authorizes the Courts of Appeals to grant or deny permission to 
appeal in their sole discretion.20   Securing appellate review of adverse class certification 
decisions was said to be difficult before its promulgation,21 and it was asserted that few litigants 
 
19 See, e.g., Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of 
Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175 (2021); Cary M. Erhard, A Discussion of the 
Interlocutory Review Of Class Certification Orders Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(f), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 151 (2002); Richard D. Freer, Interlocutory Review of Class 
Certification Decisions: A Preliminary Empirical Study of Federal and State Experiences, 35 W. 
ST. U. L. REV. 13 (2007); Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note on Law 
and Discretion in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277 (2008); William Kolasky & Kevin 
Stemp, Antitrust Class Actions: More Rigor, Fewer Shortcuts, 30 CLASS ACTION REPORTS 1 
(2009); John H. Beisner, Jessica D. Miller & Geoffrey M. Wyatt, Study Reveals US Courts of 
Appeals Are Less Receptive to Reviewing Class Certification Rulings, Skadden, Arps, Meagher 
& Flom LLP, Apr. 29, 2014, available at 
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2014/04/study-reveals-us-courts-of-appeal-are-
less-recepti 
20 This provision represented the only Rule 23 amendment to emerge from a decade of work by 
the Advisory Committee in the 1990s. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 7, at 1514-15. 
 
21 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Gould, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f): Interlocutory Appeals of 




had the means (in the case of plaintiffs) or the appetite for risk (in the case of both plaintiffs and 
defendants) to persevere to a final judgment.22 Statutory authority for interlocutory appeals is 
limited, and the main hope for such review of class certification decisions requires the approval 
of the district court and the court of appeals.23  
 
In the 1970s a number of courts of appeals, led by the Second Circuit, adopted the so 
called death knell doctrine in order to permit interlocutory review of some decisions denying 
class certification at the behest of plaintiffs who could not continue to litigate in the absence of a 
certified class.24  The Supreme Court put an end to that practice in 1978,25 as it did to 
entertaining interlocutory appeals under Section 1292(a) in putative class actions seeking 
injunctive relief.26 Thereafter, in the absence of a final judgment, if review could not be obtained 
under Section 1292(b), the only available avenue was a writ of mandamus. The perception in the 
1990s that some Courts of Appeals were using this extraordinary writ for purposes beyond its 
limited remit was one of the cited reasons for proposing Rule 23(f). The perceived inability of 
the Courts of Appeals adequately to superintend class action doctrine was another.27 
 
Rule 23(f) is facially neutral. Many predicted at the time it was being debated, and 
asserted after it was promulgated, however, that it would (or did) disproportionately benefit 
 
“appellate review of certification decisions was limited or effectively nonexistent in most class 
actions”);  Alon Klement & Robert Klonoff, Class Actions in the United Stated and Israel: A 
Comparative Approach, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 151, 163 (2018) (“Prior to 1998, it was 
very difficult to appeal a decision granting or denying class certification…”). 
22 See, e.g., Willging & Lee, supra note 3, at 324 (noting “the conventional wisdom that the 
denial of a motion to certify signals the death knell for a proposed plaintiff class and the grant of 
a motion to certify a litigation class forces the defendant to settle”).  
23 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018). 
24 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (CA2 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 
(1967). The Second Circuit, apparently alone, also permitted interlocutory review of certain 
adverse class certification decisions by defendants under the so-called “reverse death knell 
doctrine,” but it “established several conditions severely limiting its use” before the Supreme 
Court put an end to the entire enterprise. Kenneth A. Cohen, Not Dead But Only Sleeping: the 
Rejection of the Death Knell Doctrine and the Survival of Class Actions Denied Certification, 59 
B.U. L. REV. 257, 261 (1979). 
25 See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978). 
26 See Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978). 
27 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) 1998 advisory committee note. 
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defendants.28 Although the published studies of experience under Rule 23(f) vary in many 
respects, until recently they appeared largely to confirm such predictions and assertions. In the 
years studied, when the Courts of Appeals granted review under Rule 23(f), they were more 
likely to reverse than to affirm a grant of certification and more likely to affirm than to reverse a 
denial of certification.29  
 
Until recently, none of the published Rule 23(f) studies extended beyond 2012, and only 
one of them (ending in 2006) presented data on petitions for review as well as on decisions in 
cases in which review was granted.30 Decisions on petitions for review are usually not 
memorialized in opinions of any description.31 An unpublished study by a law firm working for 
the Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform (the “Skadden study”) sought to 
supplement the earlier study by compiling data on petitions for review and dispositions of cases 
granted review from October 1, 2006 through 2013. It concluded that Courts of Appeals granted 
petitions for review far less frequently in the later (2006-2013) than in the earlier (1998-2006) 
period, with the rate falling from 36% to 22.9%, and that most of that decline was attributable to 
petitions filed by defendants, for which the grant rate across all circuits declined from 45% to 
24.8% (compared to a decline from 22% to 21% for plaintiffs).32  
 
 
28 See, e.g., Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (2003) (“Circuit courts began protecting defendants as soon as the 
amendment took effect. A plaintiff who prevails on a certification motion in a trial court must 
expect to lose on appeal.”). Professor Silver noted that he “argued against the interlocutory 
appeal amendment when the Rules Committee met in Dallas, Texas in 1996.” Id. n.6. His 
assertion about what plaintiffs must expect on appeal relied on a 2003 assessment of decided 
cases finding “that no federal circuit has used 23(f) appeal to reverse denial of class 
certification.” Id. n.8. 
29 See, e.g., Sullivan & Trueblood, supra note 19, at 286 n.43; Beisner, et al., supra note 19. 
30 See Sullivan & Trueblood, supra note 19. 
31 See id. at 277 (quoting Judge Diane Wood, who observed that “[t]he vast majority of our 
rulings on 23(f) motions are not published.”); id. at 284 (“only 10% of the ‘decisions’ accepting 
or rejecting a Rule 23(f) petition are available by searching published or electronically available 
opinions” and “the rest – 90% -- are reflected in docket entries … [where] the court’s reasoning 
may not be provided”).  
32 Beisner, et al., supra note 19. A commentator synthesizing the two studies observed: “From 
1998-2006] 75 percent of the 23(f) petitions decided were from grants of certification and 25 
percent from denials. [From 2006-2013], however, 61 percent of the 23(f) petitions decided were 
from grants of certification and 39 percent from denials.” Daniel B. Rogers, Rule 23(f) After 16 
Years, 34 ANTITRUST ABA 12, 17 (2014). 
10 
 
In an April 2014 memorandum describing the study, lawyers at Skadden observed that, 
although ”it remains more likely for grants of class certification to be reversed on appeal than to 
be affirmed, and more likely for denials of class certification to be affirmed rather than 
reversed,” plaintiffs “have seen greater success with Rule 23(f) appeals than in previous years.” 
Thus, although the affirmance rate for grants of class certification remained essentially stable 
(increasing from 29% to 30%), the reversal rate for denials increased from 29% to 40%.33   
 
The authors of the 2014 memorandum reasoned that their findings “are concerning for 
defendants because low [petition] grant rates in certain circuits may signal to district courts that 
they are unlikely to be reversed … which could lead some of these courts to push the boundaries 
of their discretion in ruling on class certification.” They expressed particular concern about the 
Ninth Circuit, “where defendants filed 157 Rule 23(f) petitions and only 23 were granted.”  
Warning that “particular attention must be paid to meritless class actions” in such circuits, the 
lawyers suggested as “[o]ne potential strategy for class action defendants … to focus appellate 
courts on the need to interpret recent U.S. Supreme Court class action jurisprudence.” They 
continued: 
 
In contrast to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court has expressed a greater 
willingness to hear class certification cases in recent years. The last few years have 
produced a host of Supreme Court rulings on class action issues, including Wal-Mart 
Stores v. Dukes, Amgen v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, and Comcast v. Behrend. The 
recent Supreme Court decisions may provide an opportunity for class action litigants 
seeking appellate review to argue that further appellate interpretation is needed, 
particularly where a trial court relies on pre-Dukes and pre-Comcast appellate precedents 
in granting class certification.34  
 
Finally in connection with Rule 23(f), Professor Lammon recently completed a study of 
petitions for review and merits decisions for the period 2013-2017.35 Observing that decisions on 
granted Rule 23(f) petitions alone do not give an accurate picture of how plaintiffs and 
defendants fare under Rule 23(f), the author concludes that, for the period studied, the difference 
 
33 Beisner, et al., supra note 19. 
34 Id. For an assertion suggesting that litigants agreed that “further appellate interpretation [wa]s 
needed,” see Frank Burt & Michael Kentoff, Class Action Developments After Wal-Mart Stores 
v. Dukes, SU004 ALI-ABA 1049 (2012) (claiming that interlocutory review of commonality 
issues increased after the Supreme Court’s Dukes decision). They may not, however, have been 
defendants. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 




in grant rate as between plaintiffs (21%) and defendants (27%) is “only weak evidence that it’s 
the petitioning party that is driving the decision to grant a Rule 23(f) petition.”36 Moreover, his 
data reveal that the Courts of Appeals reversed both grants and denials of class certification 
about 54% of the time, with statistical analysis yielding the conclusion that the “numbers thus 
provide essentially no evidence that courts favor defendants over plaintiffs in the Rule 23(f) 
context.”37   When the outcomes of both petitions and certification merits decisions are 
considered, and “[g]iven that defendants file about 50% more petitions than plaintiffs do … 
plaintiffs have more total victories in the Rule 23(f) context [57%] than defendants do [43%].”38 
 
Professor Lammon’s study is important. His data do not, however, enable him completely 
to fulfill the goal of “assess[ing] the rule’s criticisms.”39 In summarizing assessments of Rule 
23(f) by supporters and critics since it became effective, the author cites articles published in 
2001, 2002, 2010, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2017, among others.40 Many of the assessments in 
question predated the activity reflected in the data on which his study relies (let alone their 
availability) and, had those assessments been based on contemporaneous data, they might have 
been accurate. It would require a longitudinal study of both petitions and merits decisions to 
reach a conclusion on that question.    
 
Whatever its significance “in the Rule 23(f) context,” denial of a petition for review does 
not necessarily represent “total victory” on the issue of class certification, an appeal from which 
may be available after a final judgment, or in the case as a whole. As previously observed, the 
conventional wisdom has been that few litigants have the resources or the appetite for risk to 
proceed to a final judgment after an adverse class certification decision in the district court.41 
Yet, not all class actions seek damages and certification under Rule 23(b)(3), and class action 
lawyers need not always rely on the prospect of a common fund to finance the litigation.  Even 
after class certification in damages class actions, there may be alternatives to settlement or trial, 
 
36 Id. at 5. 
37 Id. at 28. 
38 Id. at 45. 
39 Id. at 5. See id. at 45 (data provide “little or no support for the popular criticisms of Rule 23(f) 
-- that it favors defendants”). 
40 See id. at notes 5-7, 66-71 and accompanying text. 
41 In 2017, the Supreme Court eliminated one technique – voluntary dismissal with prejudice -- 
that some plaintiffs’ class action lawyers used in order to secure an immediate appeal while 
(hopefully) preserving class claims if the certification decision were reversed. See Microsoft 
Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017).  
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including a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or a motion for summary judgment.42 Finally, 
as Professor Klonoff observed in 2016, “the scope and sheer number of recent class action trials 
constitutes an important new trend.”43 
  
Considering the volume of class certification decisions, the literature contains many 
claims that the Courts of Appeals decided more class certification issues following the 
promulgation of Rule 23(f) in 1998.44 Yet, the picture of appellate review prior to 1998 that 
emerges from the literature is far from clear, with commentators differing on such questions as 
the incidence of review under the death knell doctrine by courts that permitted it prior to 1978, 
the utility of 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) to secure interlocutory review,45 and the role of mandamus. 
Some of the inconsistencies are likely due to changes in the mechanisms available to secure 
interlocutory review over time, including both the addition or subtraction of a particular 
mechanism (e.g., the death knell doctrine) and the impact such changes had on attitudes towards 
other mechanisms (e.g., mandamus).46  
 
42 See Willging & Lee, supra note 3, at 324 (“Given the conventional wisdom … we expected 
this figure [57.6% of cases with class certified settled] to be much higher … The defendants may 
prevail, for example, at summary judgment or at trial [or prevail on a Rule 23(f) appeal]”; id. at 
326 (discussing case in which, following certification, the district court granted summary 
judgment for the defendant, leading to an appeal by the plaintiff); Hensler, supra note    , at 1604 
(“[M]any charges about the negative consequences of class actions, such as the assertion that the 
risks of class actions are so great that they force defendants to settle non-meritorious claims – so-
called “blackmail settlements” – rest on empirical assumptions about the pattern of disposition of 
class complaints, which have gone largely untested”). 
43 Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 EMORY L.J. 1569, 1645 
(2016). 
44 See Robert H. Klonoff, F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium: The 
Future of Class Actions: The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 733 (2013) 
(arguing that Rule 23(f) increased the number of certification decisions being reviewed by 
federal appellate courts).  
45 See Roger Bernstein & Daniel Berger, Recent Developments in Private Antitrust Class 
Actions, 24 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 819, 852 (1979) (finding some success in appellate review of 
certification decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)); David C. McDonald & Jeffrey N. Ostrager, 
Federal Jurisdiction and Practice, 1979 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 535, 567 (finding review of 
certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) rare because class certification decisions usually involve 
only discretionary considerations and do not involve controlling questions of law). 
46 See Part II: Specific Applications, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 96, 202 (1984) (finding that, 
after Livesay, more appellate courts began to accept review of certification decisions via writs of 
mandamus). Compare Bernstein & Berger, supra note 43, at  852 (“Mandamus has been a 





B.   CAFA 
 
CAFA is primarily a jurisdictional statute. Some of its supporters, whose real agenda was 
retrenchment (rather than, as claimed, protecting state lawmaking prerogatives), hoped that 
channeling state-law class actions into federal court would materially reduce the probability of 
certification, if not through denial of certification by district courts, then on appellate review (as 
putatively augmented by Rule 23(f)).47 
 
In  a study undertaken shortly after CAFA was enacted, 48  researchers at the Federal 
Judicial Center found “a dramatic increase in the number of diversity class actions filed as 
original proceedings in the federal courts in the post-CAFA period.”49 Perhaps assuming that this 
documented increase would translate into a similar increase in the Courts of Appeals, a number 
of scholars have claimed that the volume of class certification appeals increased after CAFA.50 
We are aware of no empirical studies that support such claims. Having completed Phase I and 
started Phase II of the contemplated study, the FJC researchers apparently turned to other 
 
McDonald & Ostrager, supra note 45, at 567 (finding that writs of mandamus were consistently 
denied because they are limited to cases when district court judges clearly abuse their 
discretionary power) with Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule 23(f), A Good 
Rulemaking, 69 TENN. L. REV. 97, 101 (2001) (arguing that appellate review of class certification  
via writs of mandamus became increasingly popular in the 1990s).  
47 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act in Historical Context: A Preliminary 
View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1448-49, 1530 (2008); Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the 
Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1942-43, 
1951-52 (2006). 
48 The FJC undertook a “long-term study of the impact of [CAFA] on the resources of the federal 
courts … designed to examine three phases of class action activity: filing and removal of cases; 
litigation in the district courts; and appellate review.” Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, 
“The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: Third Interim Report to the Judicial 
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules” 1 (April 2007), available at    
https://www.fjc.gov/content/impact-class-action-fairness-act-2005-third-interim-report-judicial-
conference-advisory-0                                                                                                                                                                           
 
49 Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, “The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005: Fourth Interim Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules” 1 
(April 2008), available athttps://www.fjc.gov/content/impact-class-action-fairness-act-2005-
federal-courts-fourth-interim-report-judicial-0 The results for diversity class actions removed to 
federal court were different, with an increase in the immediate post-CAFA period followed by a 
return to “levels similar to those in the pre-CAFA period.” Id. at 2. 
50 See Klonoff, supra note 44, at 733 (claiming that appellate review increased after CAFA).   
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projects, with the result that they did not, in the end, “analyze the litigation activity in the 
sampled cases in the courts of appeals.”51 
 
 
C. The Class Action Jurisprudence of the Courts of Appeals   
 
As is evident from our discussion of Rule 23(f) empirical studies, claims about that rule 
include both its effect on the volume of class certification appeals and how plaintiffs and 
defendants have fared when it was invoked.  These studies ignore final-judgment appeals, 
perhaps regarding them as trivial in number.  None of them purports to characterize the tenor of 
class action jurisprudence on the Courts of Appeals as a whole in its impact on plaintiffs and 
defendants. Yet, as we show below, final-judgment appeals comprise about half of all appeals 
between 2002 and 2017, and thus their absence from existing studies significantly limits the 
inferences that can be drawn from them.  In the absence of reliable empirical data, commentators 
have been left to their own devices in making claims about the tenor of that jurisprudence.    
 
In a famous article surveying the early history of amended Rule 23, Professor Miller 
claimed that, following an initial period of optimism about the effects of the rule on the quest for 
justice, the Courts of Appeals were more skeptical of class actions, and that this period lasted 
from 1969 to 1973 or 1974, during which there were many interlocutory appeals that stabilized 
“various aspects of rule 23 practice.”52 Others writing about the first few decades of experience 
under Rule 23 remarked the difficulty of identifying clear trends, arguing that circuits varied in 
their receptivity to class actions.53  
 
Scholars seem to have reached consensus, however, that in the decade preceding the 
promulgation of Rule 23(f), the Courts of Appeals were more likely to reverse than to affirm 
class certification orders. They differed, however, on the significance of the phenomenon they 
posited, with some suggesting that the appellate courts were merely insisting on the rigor that the 
 
51 Federal Judicial Center, “Progress Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on the 
Impact of CAFA on the Federal Courts” 1 (Nov. 2007), available at 
https://www.fjc.gov/content/progress-report-advisory-committee-civil-rules-impact-cafa-federal-
courts-0  
52 See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein, Monsters, and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the 
“Class Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 678, 679, 682 (1979).   
53 See Bernstein & Berger, supra note 45, at 853-54; David Marcus, Erie, The Class Action 
Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1247, 1284, 1305 (2007); Andew A. Wittenstein, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Class 
Actions-Antitrust Law-Rebuttable Presumption That Sherman Act Plaintiffs Entitled to Class 
Certification Under Rule 23, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 177, 187 (1976-1977). 
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Supreme Court had called for in 1982,54 and “rein[ing] in overzealous grants of certification,”55 
while one scholar posited an “antiplaintiff bias among federal appeals judges,” a majority of 
whom had been nominated by Republican presidents.56 
 
Writing in 2016, Professor Klonoff asserted that the Courts of Appeals used their 
increased opportunities under Rule 23(f) to erect “significant roadblocks to class certification.” 57 
In the same article, however, he noted that some courts of appeals had resisted broad 
interpretations of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wal-Mart and Comcast.58 And even more 
recently, he suggested that such decisions may reflect a backlash against overreaching by 
defendants or interest groups seeking further retrenchment of class actions.59 
 
Finally, Professor David Marcus reported the results of his analysis of every reported 
class certification decision in a federal public interest case between June 21, 2011 and March 31, 
2020. Having noted his pessimism after the first three post-Wal-Mart appeals resulted in 
decertification orders,60 he continued: 
  
But a hard pro-defendant turn in the doctrinal regulation of the public interest 
class action has not materialized. Since the last of the three initial cases, the 
 
54 See Mark Adams, Developing Class Action Strategies Based on Recent Key Decisions, 2011 
WL 5617993 at *12 (2011) (claiming that, as part of a steady trend that began with the Supreme 
Court’s 1982 Falcon decision, federal appellate courts are “increasingly probing plaintiff's 
claims and defendant's defenses to determine whether a class should be certified”).    
55 See Freer, supra note 19, at 14; (citing one appellate court case in support); see also Erhard, 
supra note 17, at 155 (noting that mandamus review was rare and usually used to decertify 
classes and citing four cases in support of this proposition). 
56 Marcus, supra note 53, at 1304.  
57 Klonoff, supra note 43, at 1623-24.  
58 See id. at 1613, 1618. We follow Professor Klonoff in focusing on Wal-Mart’s holding 
concerning commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), recognizing, of course, that the Court in that case 
also rendered an important holding concerning the proper interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2).  
59 See supra text accompanying note 15. 
60 See David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 781 (2016). 
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federal circuits have decided 22 additional appeals involving the propriety of class 
certification. Plaintiffs have won 17 of these cases… .61 
 
Rejecting the notion that such success reflects “‘narrowing from below’ – of lower federal courts 
fashioning a less intrusive interpretation of Wal-Mart to blunt its impact,” he argues that “Wal-
Mart’s demand for rigorous analysis has forced lawyers and judges to articulate with more 
precision the contours of the substantive rights that [certain types of] plaintiffs vindicate.”62 
 
 Klonoff and Marcus have in common a recognition that changes in appellate panels’ 
certification behavior over time may be a function of changes in the quality of cases they are 
deciding, which in turn may be a function of parties changing behavior in response to changes in 
the law, such as the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wal-Mart and Comcast.  It is also likely that 
appellate panels are responding to changes in law in ways that lead them to decide comparable 
cases differently after a change in law than they did before.  For example, they may be seeking to 
faithfully implement Supreme Court decisions, or to counteract them.  We will not be able to 
untangle the multiple causal forces that may be at play.  In light of all this complexity, our 
ambition is to offer a descriptive account of certification over time, not a causal one.     
 
II.  Longitudinal Patterns in Certification Decisions 
  We examine both published and unpublished decisions. With respect to published 
(precedential) decisions, we endeavored to build a comprehensive dataset of federal Court of 
Appeals panel decisions addressing whether a class should be certified from 1966, when the 
modern Rule 23 became effective, through 2017.63 With respect to unpublished 
(nonprecedential) decisions, we collected the same data from 2002, by which time nearly all 
 
61 David Marcus, The Persistence and Uncertain Future of the Public Interest Class Action, 24 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 395, 409 (2020). See also Klonoff, supra note 43, at 1591 (“Overall, 
despite some setbacks, the cases give reason for some optimism. Dukes, no doubt, will pose 
obstacles in some cases, but the fact that important cases seeking structural relief continue to be 
certified is encouraging.”). 
62 Marcus, supra note 61, at 417. 
63 See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 18, Appendix, Section I.A, for further details on data 
collection.  As discussed in the Appendix to this paper, our data include certification decisions 
with respect to settlement classes.  Our data do not, however, include en banc decisions, of which 




unpublished decisions appeared in the Federal Appendix, through 2017.64 In total, we identified 
1,344 certification decisions. 
 
 Of course, published Court of Appeals decisions differ from unpublished decisions in 
important respects, and published decisions are not representative of all litigated cases.65 We can 
learn from both types of decisions. We are interested, in part, in the creation and development of 
law. Published Court of Appeals opinions are the vehicle through which circuits create and 
develop law that is binding on all subsequent panels and on all district courts in the circuit, while 
unpublished decisions have no precedential weight. In one set of models we will examine only 
published opinions. 
 
 We are also interested in the full universe of decided certification appeals. In addition to 
the possible unrepresentativeness of published decisions with respect to judicial behavior, there 
may be other selection processes at play when analyzing only published opinions. The same 
judges that render decisions in published opinions also decide whether the decisions will be 
published, threatening to confound inferences about the relationship between explanatory 
variables and case outcomes when one studies only published decisions. Thus, we also examine 
models of published and unpublished decisions restricted to the circuit years for which we have 
complete data on both. In those models, unpublished decisions comprise about one-third of the 
cases.  For the most part, but not always, the results look very similar to what we observe when 
analyzing only published decisions. 
 
 Our dependent variable is whether a decision is pro- or anti-certification. In order to code 
it, the certification analysis in each decision was read in full. We code a decision as pro-
certification (=1) if the Court of Appeals affirms the trial court’s certification, reverses the trial 
court’s decision not to certify and directs it to certify, or reverses the trial court’s decision not to 
certify and remands for further proceedings on certification. We code a decision as 
anticertification (=0) if the Court of Appeals affirms the trial court’s decision not to certify, 
 
64 Id. We say “nearly” all unpublished decisions because the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ 
unpublished decisions did not consistently appear in the Federal Appendix until 2003 and 2005, 
respectively. See Andrew T. Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for 
Ethical Problems & Legal Malpractice?, 26 MISS. COLL. L. REV. 185, 205–06 (2007).  Our models 
that include unpublished opinions account for this. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 18, Appendix, 
Section I.A. 
 
65 See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court 
System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1989); David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, 
Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 843 (2005); Deborah 
Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71 (2001). 
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reverses the trial court’s decision to certify and directs that a class not be certified, or reverses the 
trial court’s decision to certify and remands for further proceedings on certification. 
 
A. Certification Over Time 
 
1. The Volume of Final-Judgment and Interlocutory Appeals 
 
Figure 1 displays regression estimates of counts of all decisions and separately shows 
final-judgment versus interlocutory appeals.  The number of published decisions grew steeply 
beginning in 1967, peaked in the late 1970s, and declined over the course of the 1980s and 1990s 
until the turn upward that followed Rule 23(f).  Because the regression curve smooths over year-
to-year fluctuations, it does not reveal sharp breaks in the data, and thus the raw underlying data 
are instructive.  Inspecting the raw counts indicates that the post-Rule 23(f) counts began to grow 
in 2000.  In the 1990s there were an average of twelve published decisions a year addressing 
certification; the number grew to twenty-two in 2000-09 and to thirty-two in 2010-17. By 2017 
the estimated number of published decisions matched its peak in the late 1970s.    
Figure 1: Number of All Decisions, Final Judgment v. Interlocutory 
 
 We can say with confidence that interlocutory appeals were responsible for the lion’s 
share of the growth in published certification decisions following Rule 23(f).  The trajectory of 
growth is also evident when unpublished decisions are added from 2002-17, during which time 
they constitute about one-third of the total in our data.  During this period the decisions were 
fairly evenly balanced between interlocutory and final-judgment appeals.66 
 
66 In published and unpublished decisions from 2002-2017, 49% were final-judgment appeals.  
Approximately 50% were interlocutory and cited Rule 23(f) as the jurisdictional basis or (in a 
small fraction of cases) cited no jurisdictional basis, which we assume arose under Rule 23(f).  In 




Interlocutory appeals comprised 14% of published decisions prior to 2000 and 57% of them from 
2000-17.  At least in the domain of precedential decisions, final-judgment appeals dominated 
interlocutory appeals (comprising 86%) prior to 2000.67  Although this is consistent with 
conventional wisdom that securing interlocutory review was difficult during this period, we lack 
data on unpublished decisions prior to Rule 23(f), and thus we do not know the fraction of total 
appeals that were interlocutory during that period.  We also lack data on the frequency with 
which interlocutory review was sought, which would be important to assessing the difficulty of 
securing it. 
2. The Volume of Certification Appeals with Federal, State, and Combined 
Federal/State Causes of Action.   
 Figure 2 displays estimated counts of decisions separated by whether certification was 
sought as to a class asserting only a federal claim, only a state claim, or both federal and state 
claims.  Because courts often fail to state the basis of jurisdiction, we found that claims in federal 
court under the Class Action Fairness Act could not be reliably coded.  However, such claims 
would be encompassed within cases seeking certification of state claims only.  A substantial 
majority of published decisions on certification prior to 2005 were in cases seeking certification 
of federal claims only.  After 2005 the number of decisions in cases seeking certification of state 
claims only grew threefold.  In published and unpublished decisions in 2002-17, certification 
decisions on state law-only classes grew more strongly, increasing fivefold and becoming as 
frequent as certification decisions on classes asserting only federal claims.    
  
 
appeal, and none cited mandamus.  Some of this 2% may have actually arisen under Rule 23(f).  
The Supreme Court promulgated Rule 23(f) pursuant to Section 1292(e), which provides that 
“The Supreme Court may prescribe rules … to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision 
to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d).”  
Thus, at least some courts regard Rule 23(f) appeals as arising under § 1292, see Wachtel ex rel. 
Jesse v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 453 F.3d 179, 184 (3rd Cir. 2006), and it is possible 
that some courts cited only Section 1292 in a 23(f) appeal.  It is clear that in the 2002-17 period 
the vast majority of interlocutory appeals were under Rule 23(f).    
67 In published cases prior to 1998 (when Rule 23(f) came into effect), 86 percent of the appeals 
were final-judgment, 8% were interlocutory under Section 1292, 2% were interlocutory under a 
writ of mandamus, and an additional 3% were interlocutory but without the court identifying the 




Figure 2: Number of Decisions: Federal Law Only, State Law Only,  
and Federal and State Claims 
 
 
3.  Interlocutory Appeals and (b)(3) versus (b)(2) Classes 
We also examined whether the growth in availability of interlocutory review had a 
disproportionate impact on the proportion of appeals addressing (b)(2) versus (b)(3) classes.  The 
notion that prior to Rule 23(f) parties would settle rather than litigate after a district court 
certification decision was particularly focused on damages classes under (b)(3).  If this dynamic 
were at play, we would expect to see that (b)(3) classes are more likely to appear in appeals 
under interlocutory versus final-judgment review. 
We found that opinions do not reliably identify the type of class for which certification is 
sought under Rule 23(b).  This is especially true when the issues on appeal concern application 
of Rule 23(a).  However, we can gain some insight from issues that appeared in the certification 
analysis.  Coders identified whether opinions addressed the (b)(3) requirements of predominance 
and superiority, and whether they addressed (b)(2) requirements for an injunctive class.   The 
percentage of such decisions that appeared in final-judgment and interlocutory appeals in 
published and unpublished opinions from 2002-17 is displayed in Table 1, as is the information 
broken down by appeals by defendants only and appeals by plaintiffs only.          
Table 1: Percentage of Final-Judgment versus Interlocutory Appeals in (b)(3) and (b)(2) Classes 






(b)(3) Final-Judgment 33% 40% 35% 
(b)(3) Interlocutory 57% 58% 53% 
(b)(2) Final-Judgment 10% 15% 7% 




Final-judgment appeals of certification decisions with respect to (b)(3) classes are far 
from aberrant.  They occurred in 33% of the decisions—40% of those appealed only by 
defendants.  This casts doubt on the notion that parties are rarely willing to litigate through to 
final judgment once a district court has certified or declined to certify a class.  It is true, however, 
that (b)(3) issues are materially more likely to appear in interlocutory than final-judgment 
appeals.  They were addressed in more than half of the interlocutory appeals in our data.  We 
acknowledge, of course, that, without knowing the size of the population of district court 
decisions on (b)(3) issues, we cannot know the rate of either type of appeal from the universe of 
potentially appealable decisions.68     
 Appeals of decisions on whether to certify an injunctive class are much less frequent 
events, and the difference in their frequency in final-judgment versus interlocutory appeals is 
small in absolute terms.  They occurred in 10% of final-judgment appeals and 13% of 
interlocutory appeals.   There was no difference in the frequency with which they appeared 
across the two types of appeals when only the defendant appealed.  When only the plaintiff 
appealed the percentage grew from 7 to 12 – significant in relative terms (a 71% increase) but 
small in absolute terms (a 5-percentage point increase). 
4. Probability of Reversal in Interlocutory versus Final-Judgment Appeals 
Much of the empirical literature on Rule 23(f) has focused on comparing rates of reversal 
by Courts of Appeals in cases in which the district court certified as compared to when it denied 
certification.  These studies treated the data cross-sectionally within blocks of time.  Figure 3 
shows rates of reversal of district court grants and denials of certification for published and 
unpublished opinions from 2002-17.  We focus only on this period because we want to compare 
reversals of grants versus denials of certification in all (not just published) interlocutory appeals 
and to compare the results to those in final-judgment appeals. 
  
 
68 We considered the possibility that the percentage of (b)(3) final-judgment appeals may be 
materially affected by plaintiff-objector challenges to (b)(3) settlements, since approval of a 
settlement is a final judgment and plaintiff-objectors may challenge certification after that order 
is entered.  This is not the case.  The percentage of cases presenting each type of appeal is the 
same or nearly so when settlement classes are excluded: 33% are (b)(3) final-judgment, 57% are 
(b)(3) interlocutory, 9% are (b)(2) final-judgment, and 14% are (b)(2) interlocutory.  Again, 




Figure 3: Reversals by the Courts of Appeals of District Court Grants & Denials of Certification 
 
 In interlocutory appeals, the estimated probability of reversal of a district court grant of 
certification had been climbing steeply in the years before Wal-Mart, from 52% in 2002 to 71% 
in 2010.  At the time Wal-Mart was decided, defendants had a very high rate of success in using 
interlocutory review to reverse grants of certification.  After Wal-Mart the trend reversed, and 
the probability declined precipitously by 39-percentage points, to 32% in 2017.  The pattern for 
reversals of denials of certification is less clear.  It vacillated before Wal-Mart and showed no 
clear trend after it. 
The figure makes clear that, prior to Wal-Mart, interlocutory appeals were far more 
frequently used to reverse grants of certification than to reverse denials.  If, as some have 
suggested, this was the intended result of some advocates of Rule 23(f), the evidence is 
consistent with their hopes for about a decade after Rule 23(f) appeals began to grow in 2000.  
From 2002 to 2010, the average annual probability of reversing a grant was 64%, and the 
probability of reversing a denial was 35%.  However, by the end of the series it had become 
slightly more likely that a denial of certification would be reversed as compared to a grant.    
 In final-judgment appeals, we observe a similar pattern of growth in the estimated 
probability of reversing a grant of certification at the beginning of the series, followed by a long 
decline.  However, the decline begins earlier (in 2008), although it appears to have steepened 
after Wal-Mart, and the size of the decline from the peak to the end of the series is 20-percentage 
points (about half the size of the 39-percentage point decline observed in interlocutory appeals).  
The probability of reversal of district court denials of certification was very low and fairly stable 
before Wal-Mart, averaging 14% from 2002-10.  It then turned up and rose to 27% by 2017, 
about doubling.       
 The figure makes clear that prior to Wal-Mart, as with interlocutory appeals, final-
judgment appeals were far more frequently successful in reversing grants of certification than 
denials. From 2002 to 2010, the average annual probability of reversing a grant was 40%, as 
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compared to the 14% probability of reversing a denial.  Also as with interlocutory appeals, by the 
end of the series it had become slightly more likely that a denial of certification would be 
reversed as compared to a grant.   
5.  Probability of Pro-Certification Outcomes by Partisan Majority 
Figure 4 displays the probability of a pro-certification outcome in all cases, and in cases 
with Democratic- versus Republican-majority panels.  We limit the data in published decisions to 
1970-2017 because in the first several years of our data there are too few cases to provide 
meaningful estimates of outcomes.  In published decisions, there was a long-run, gradual decline 
in the estimated probability of a pro-certification outcome from 46% in 1975 to 39% in the mid-
1980s, where it remained relatively flat for two decades before turning upward around 2007 and 
growing 21-percentage points by 2017, ending the series with a 58% probability of certification, 
the highest in the forty-eight year series. 
Figure 4: Outcomes in All Decisions & Democratic v. Republican Majorities 
 
Although Democratic- and Republican-majority panels started the 1970s with a clear gap 
between them, the gap narrowed, and Democratic- and Republican-majority panels were 
relatively close from the mid-1970s to the late-1990s.  The gap widened significantly at the end 
of the 1990s, at the same time that Rule 23(f) came into effect.  The widening gap between 
Democratic- and Republican-majority panels also corresponds temporally to findings in our prior 
work that in about the mid- to late-1990s there was growing focus in the Republican Party on 
restricting opportunities and incentives for private civil actions in general and class actions in 
particular. Congressional Republicans introduced a growing number of anti-class action bills; 
important advocacy groups associated with the Republican Party, specifically including business 
groups and conservative law reform organizations, elevated their focus on curtailing class 
actions, and Supreme Court justices became more polarized along ideological lines in their 
voting on Rule 23 issues.69 
 
69 See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 7, at 1524–28. 
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However, surprisingly (to us), the distance between Democratic- and Republican- 
majority panels stabilized after around 2010, when the probability of a pro-certification outcome 
on Republican-majority panels began to grow steeply alongside that of Democratic-majority 
panels.  The gap between them was an average of 23-percentage points from 2011 to 2017.  At 
the end of the series, when in the posture of making law, both Democratic- and Republican- 
majority panels were at their highest probability of pro-certification outcomes in the forty-eight 
years covered by the data.  
 When unpublished decisions are added for the period 2002-17, the pattern is similar.  
Democratic- and Republican-majority panels are close together at the start, but the gap is already 
growing, with Republican-majority panels moving in an anti-certification direction.  After about 
2010 the probability turns upward for Republican-majority panels, and both types of panels grow 
increasingly likely to render pro-certification outcomes through the end of the series, separated 
by an average of 23-percentage points from 2011 to 2017. 
6.  Probability of Pro-Certification Outcomes by Certification Issue 
It is natural to wonder whether outcome patterns vary depending on the specific class 
action issues addressed by the court.  Comcast is typically seen as taking a restrictive approach to 
predominance, and Wal-Mart is widely regarded as making commonality more difficult to 
satisfy.  Figure 5 displays the probability of a pro-certification outcome separately for decisions 
in which (1) the court addressed an issue of commonality, (2) the court addressed an issue of 
predominance, and (3) the court evaluated certification but addressed neither issues of 
commonality nor predominance.  The third category is limited to cases that had no logical 
connection to the features of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wal-Mart and Comcast that 
divided the Court and elicited controversy. 
Figure 5: Outcomes by Certification Issues Addressed 
 
Viewing published decisions from 1970-2017, the presence of a commonality issue was 
associated with growing rates of pro-certification outcomes over time for more than three 
decades prior to the Wal-Mart decision.  Rather than declining after Wal-Mart, the rate of pro-
certification outcomes escalated more rapidly through the end of the series.  In 2017, there was a 
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71% probability of a pro-certification outcome, a high point in the forty-seven year series.  The 
presence of a predominance issue was associated with declining rates of pro-certification 
outcomes from 1970 to 2000, was stable through 2005, and then escalated sharply by 21-
percentage points to 54% in 2016 (before declining slightly in the last year).  The probability of a 
pro-certification outcome in 2017 was equivalent to the probability in 1970.   
 In certification decisions that did not address either commonality or predominance issues, 
the probability of a pro-certification outcome declined from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, was 
stable until 2000, and increased by 18-percentage points through the end of the series.  In 2017, 
there was a 52% probability of a pro-certification outcome, a high point in the series.  In all three 
sets of cases the probability was rising prior to the Wal-Mart and Comcast decisions and 
continued rising to new heights after them.                
 When unpublished decisions are added for 2002-17, we observe some noteworthy 
differences at the end of the series relative to examining only published decisions in which 
commonality and predominance issues were addressed.  The upward trajectory in pro-
certification outcomes in decisions with commonality issues continued growing through Wal-
Mart in 2011 and peaked (at 60%) in 2015, but then declined to 50% in 2017.  The previously 
growing rate of pro-certification outcomes in decisions addressing predominance issues 
plateaued at 46% for the three years following Comcast and then declined by 5-percentage points 
in 2017.  Viewing the two panels of the figure together, the plateau and/or decline in pro-
certification outcomes in decisions presenting commonality and predominance issues in the post-
Wal-Mart/Comcast period is not present in decisions through which circuits are electing to make 
law, and it appears to be driven by declining probability of pro-certification outcomes in 
unpublished decisions.   
 Thus, when all appeals are pooled in 2002-17, the bivariate story is one of growing 
probability of pro-certification outcomes in cases presenting commonality or predominance 
issues prior to the Wal-Mart and Comcast decisions, and an arrest or reversal of that growth 
following the decisions.  The passage of four years between Wal-Mart and the decline in 
probability of a pro-certification outcome in cases presenting a commonality issue certainly gives 
one pause in attributing the decline to Wal-Mart.  With respect to Comcast, the arrest in the 
growth pattern is more proximate in time to the decision.   In contrast, in cases presenting neither 
commonalty nor predominance issues the probability of a pro-certification outcome was stable at 
about 25% for the five years leading up to Wal-Mart in 2011, and then it more than doubled to 
reach 55% by 2017 with no plateau or decline.     
 
B. Empirical Models  
 
 We use statistical models to further examine the relationship between outcomes in 
certification decisions, partisan majorities, interlocutory appeals, and post-Comcast certification 
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outcomes.  The models allow us to test the statistical significance, conditional on important 
control variables, of certain patterns that we observe in the bivariate figures.   A key focus in the 
models is temporal change.  We include an indicator variable measuring pre- and post-Comcast 
decisions.  We are interested in the general question whether plaintiffs seeking certification fared 
worse on appeal after Wal-Mart and Comcast, and the period after Comcast is the period during 
which both decisions were in effect.70  We also include a linear time trend variable.   
 
  In the model of published decisions from 1967-2017, we include an indicator variable 
distinguishing the 1967-94 period from the 1995-2017 period.  As documented in our prior work, 
noted above, the mid-to-late 1990s saw growing congressional Republican efforts to retrench 
private enforcement in general and class actions in particular; business groups and conservative 
law reform organizations elevated their focus on curtailing class actions, and Supreme Court 
justices became more polarized along ideological lines in their voting on Rule 23 issues. 
 
 In addition to these temporal variables, we include variables indicating whether an appeal 
was interlocutory and whether the panel was majority-Democrat or majority-Republican.  In one 
set of models, we include interactions between the partisan majority variable and the variables 
measuring whether the appeal was interlocutory and whether it was post-Comcast.  These 
interactions will allow us to evaluate whether the effect of ideology on the probability of a pro-
certification outcome was different in interlocutory appeals or after Comcast.  Finally, the 
models also include a battery of control variables that is detailed in the Appendix, including 
circuit fixed effects, policy area, direction of the district court decision, numerous case 
characteristics, and the racial and gender composition of the panel.   
 
1. Interlocutory and Post-Comcast Appeals 
 
We initially examine models with the main effects of the variables described above, 
without the interactions with partisan majority.  In our model of published decisions over the full 
period of 1967-2017,71 the post-Comcast variable is significant and positive, associated with a 
22-percentage point growth in pro-certification outcomes, increasing the probability from 40% to 
62%.  The year variable is significant and negative, associated with a reduction of one 
percentage point a year in probability of pro-certification outcome.  Thus, conditional on many 
controls, when panels were making precedential decisions there was a long-run gradual negative 
 
70 When one includes both post-Wal-Mart and post-Comcast indicator variables in the same 
model, the post-Comcast variable is consistently significant, and the post-Wal-Mart variable is 
consistently insignificant.  Thus, the statistical models indicate that March 2013 breakpoint, 
when Comcast was decided, better explains the growth in pro-certification outcomes than June 
2011, when Wal-Mart was decided.    
71 Model A in Table A-1 (Appendix).   
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time trend in the probability of a pro-certification outcome, with a sharp reversal to a 
substantially increased probability in the post-Comcast period. 
 The probability of a pro-certification outcome is 37% for Republican-majority panels and 
50% for Democratic-majority panels, for a 13-percentage point swing.72  The 1995 dummy 
variable is insignificant, indicating that conditional on other variables in the model (including the 
linear time trend and post-Comcast variable) there was no statistically significant post-1994 
change in the probability of a pro-certification outcome.  Finally, whether an appeal is 
interlocutory is not significantly associated with a pro- versus anti-certification outcome. 
 Turning to the model of all (published and unpublished) decisions in 2002-17,73 the 
Democratic-majority and post-Comcast variables remain significant with a larger party 
magnitude and a smaller post-Comcast magnitude as compared to published decisions from 1967 
to 2017.  Democratic majorities are 19-percentage points more likely to produce pro-certification 
outcomes.  Republican-majority panels do so at a rate of 28%, and Democratic-majority panels 
do so at a rate of 47%.  In the post-Comcast period, the probability of a pro-certification outcome 
grew by 13-percengate points, from 31% to 44%.  The time trend variable and the interlocutory 
variable are both insignificant in this model.      
2. The Relationship between Party and Interlocutory Appeals 
 
We next add to these models interaction terms of the interlocutory variable with whether 
the panel had a Democratic majority, and the post-Comcast variable with whether the panel had a 
Democratic majority.74  These interaction variables tell us whether party has a distinctive 
association with outcomes (1) in interlocutory versus non-interlocutory decisions, and (2) in the 
post-Comcast versus pre-Comcast period.  They answer these questions: Were judges more or 
less ideological in interlocutory decisions and in the post-Comcast period? 
 We first examine the model of precedential decisions from 1967-2017.75  The interaction 
of the Democratic-majority and interlocutory variables disaggregates the variables into four 
possible combinations: final-judgment/Republican majority, final-judgment/Democratic 
majority, interlocutory/Republican majority, and interlocutory/Democratic majority.  The 
 
72 We find much larger party effects when we compare panels with more specific partisan 
configurations (like all-Democrats versus all-Republicans).  See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 
17, at 260-61.  In this paper we use only the party majority variable in order to facilitate the party 
majority interactions with the post-Comcast period and the interlocutory variable.       
73 Model B in Table A-1 (Appendix).   
74 Models C and D in Table A-1 (Appendix).   
75 Model C in Table A-1 (Appendix). 
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predicted probabilities are displayed in Table 2.  In final-judgment appeals, Republican-majority 
panels have a 41% probability of pro-certification outcome, which grows to 48% on Democratic-
majority panels.  In interlocutory appeals, the probability for Republican-majority panels 
declines from 41 to 29%, and on Democratic-majority panels it increases from 48 to 56%.  The 
gap between Republican- and Democratic-majority panels grows from only 7% in final-
judgment appeals to 27% in interlocutory appeals.  This difference is statistically significant.     
Table 2: Predicted Probabilities of Outcome by Appeal Type & Partisan Majority,  
Published Cases 1967-2017 
 
 Rep Maj Dem Maj 
Final Judgment 41% 48% 
Interlocutory 29% 56% 
 
We see parallel results in the model of all decisions in 2002-17 with the interactions 
included.  The predicted probabilities are displayed in Table 3.  Again, Republican-majority 
panels have a lower probability of pro-certification outcomes in interlocutory as opposed to 
final-judgment appeals (although the difference is small), and Democratic-majority panels have a 
higher probability of certifying in interlocutory than in final-judgment appeals.  Democratic-
majority panels are more likely to certify than Republican-majority panels by 12-percentage 
points in final-judgment appeals, a gap that grows substantially to 26-percengate points in 
interlocutory appeals.   
Table 3: Predicted Probabilities of Outcome by Appeal Type & Partisan Majority,  
Published & Unpublished Cases 2002-2017 
 
 Rep Maj Dem Maj 
Final Judgment 30% 42% 
Interlocutory 26% 52% 
 
We conclude that Court of Appeals judges vote more ideologically in interlocutory 
appeals.  We cannot explain with confidence why this is so.  It may be that granting  
interlocutory review selects cases with characteristics (such as the size of the stakes, or legal 
indeterminacy) that elicit more ideological voting, or it may be that the presentation of the 
certification issue early in the litigation as opposed to post-final judgment does so, or both.  
Whatever the mechanism, this result shows that Rule 23(f) contributed to the growing distance 
between Republican- and Democratic-majority panels beginning in around 2000.  The number of 
interlocutory appeals grew sharply after Rule 23(f) went into effect (Figure 1); interlocutory 
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appeals were associated with more ideological voting, and Democratic- and Republican- 
majority panels grew more distant in their probability of pro-certification outcomes (Figure 4).76   
3. The Relationship between Party and Post-Comcast Certification 
 
The interaction of the post-Comcast variable with the Democratic-majority variable is 
clearly insignificant in both the 1967-2017 model of published decisions and the 2002-17 model 
of all decisions.  This result shows that the large post-Comcast growth in probability of pro-
certification outcomes was not distinctively driven by Democratic- or Republican-majority 
panels.  Both saw a comparably large magnitude of growth in their probability of pro-
certification outcome after Comcast.  It was a co-partisan development, as reflected in Figure 4. 
4. The Relationship Between Post-Comcast Certification and the Rule 23 
Certification Issues Presented 
 
Although Wal-Mart’s focus was on commonality, and Comcast’s was on predominance, 
thus far in evaluating the post-Comcast effect we have not been distinguishing between issues 
presented.  We examined a series of models in which we interacted the post-Comcast variable 
with issue variables measuring whether the court addressed (1) predominance or commonality, 
(2) predominance but not commonality, and (3) commonality but not predominance.  We did so 
in both the 1967-2017 model of published decisions, and the 2002-17 model of all decisions.  
These interactions test whether the designated issues have a distinctive relationship with 
outcomes post-Comcast that is not captured by the main effects of the issue variables and the 
post-Comcast variable.  The interactions were all clearly insignificant.77  Predominance and 
commonality issues, as compared to other issues, did not have an association with outcomes 
post-Comcast that was statistically distinguishable from the pre-Comcast period.  The post-
Comcast growth in probability of certification cut across issue areas and clearly extended beyond 
predominance and commonality.   
 Finally, we noted when discussing the figure of outcomes by issue type (Figure 5) that 
the 2002-17 bivariate data on both published and unpublished decisions looked consistent with a 
 
76 This does not mean, however, that Rule 23(f) is the sole cause of the growing distance 
between Democratic- and Republican-majority panels in the 2000s.  When we examine a version 
of Figure 4 based only on final-judgment appeals, we continue to see clear evidence of a 
widening distance between Democratic- and Republican-majority panels.  Thus, Rule 23(f) 
contributed to, but does not by itself explain, the marked growth in ideological voting on 
certification issues in the 2000s. 
77 We added these variables to Models C and D, Table A-1 (Appendix).  This is also true of cases 
presenting a commonality issue when we use a post-Wal-Mart (instead of post-Comcast) dummy 
variable and its interaction with the commonality issue variable.   
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post-Comcast arrest in the previous upward trajectory in the probability of pro-certification 
outcomes in cases presenting commonality and predominance issues (but not other issues).  
However, the models with controls that we just discussed tell us that decisions that addressed 
commonality and predominance issues were not statistically distinguishable from those that did 
not.  It is certainly possible that, if we had more post-Comcast years of data, we would detect 
that the post-Comcast growth in probability of pro-certification outcome for this subset of cases 
is statistically distinguishable from other issue areas.    
5. The Relationship between Post-Comcast Certification and Direction of 
District Court Decision 
 
 As we have discussed, some have suggested that, in the wake of Wal-Mart and Comcast, 
defendants were emboldened to overreach by pressing weaker arguments for denial of 
certification, and that plaintiffs elevated the quality of their advocacy for certification.78  Such 
changes in the quality of defendants’ and plaintiffs’ positions in the post-Comcast period could 
explain the post-Comcast growth in probability of a pro-certification outcome on the Courts of 
Appeals.  This may have happened because defendants pressed weaker arguments on appeal 
when certification was granted in the district court, or because plaintiffs pressed stronger 
arguments on appeal challenging denial of certification in the district court.  It is also possible 
that, independent of such party selection effects, trial courts, on average, interpreted Wal-Mart 
and Comcast in a more anti-certification direction than preferred by the Courts of Appeal.  This 
would produce an elevated probability of reversing certification denials (plaintiff wins) and a 
declining probability of reversing certification grants (defendant wins).  Our data cannot 
adjudicate among these causal theories.      
 We can, however, explore some aspects of the data implicated by these theories.  Figure 
3, depicting rates of reversal over time, showed that in the post-Wal-Mart/Comcast period 
defendants achieved lower rates of reversal of certification, and plaintiffs achieved higher rates 
of reversal of denials of certification.  The former is consistent with appellate panels’ perception 
that defendants were bringing weaker appeals, and the latter is consistent with their perception 
that plaintiffs were bringing stronger appeals.   
We now test whether the relationship between the direction of the district court decision 
(grant or denial of certification) had a statistically distinguishable relationship with probability of 
reversal after Comcast as compared to before.  We do so in the same statistical model with 
controls used to estimate outcomes (described above and in the Appendix), but we use reversal 
(as opposed to outcome) as the dependent variable.  We run this model only on decisions that 
were appealed by only the defendant, or only the plaintiff (92% of the cases), dropping cases in 
which both plaintiff and defendant appealed, or objectors or intervenors appealed (8% of the 
cases, primarily with objector-appellants).  We do this to allow a clear interpretation that 
 
78 This could, of course, include not pursing certification at all in weaker cases.   
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reversals of certification are defendant wins, and reversals of denial of certification are plaintiff 
wins.  In alternative specifications we ran the reversal models on all cases (regardless of 
appellant) and the results were nearly identical.         
The battery of independent variables in the model includes the direction of the district 
court outcome (grant versus denial), the post-Comcast variable, and their interaction.  The 
interaction captures whether the direction of the district court outcome had a distinctive 
association with probability of reversal in the post-Comcast period.  The interaction was 
statistically insignificant in the model of published decisions in 1967-2017, but it was highly 
statistically significant with a very large effect in the 2002-17 model of all decisions.79  
 The interaction of the district court outcome and the post-Comcast variable disaggregates 
the variables into four possible combinations: Pre-Comcast/District Court (DC) denial of 
certification, Pre-Comcast/DC grant of certification, Post-Comcast/DC denial of certification, 
and Post-Comcast/DC grant of certification.  The predicted probabilities of reversal associated 
with each combination are presented in Table 4.  In the pre-Comcast period, the Courts of 
Appeals were 23-percentage points more likely to reverse when reviewing a grant of certification 
as compared to a denial of certification.  Defendants were far more likely to secure reversal.   
Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Reversal by Pre- and Post-Comcast & District Court 
Outcome, Published & Unpublished Cases 2002-2017 
 
 DJ denial DJ grant 
Pre-Comcast 27% 50% 
Post-Comcast 42% 42% 
 
In the post-Comcast period this large defendant advantage vanished, with panels having 
the same probability of reversing grants and denials of certification.  Moving from pre- to post-
Comcast, plaintiffs’ probability of securing reversal of a denial of certification grew from 27% to 
42% (a positive movement of 15-percentage points), while defendants’ probability of securing 
reversal of a grant of certification declined from 50% to 42% (a negative movement of 8-
percentage points).  Thus, the model results indicate that the larger share (about two-thirds) of 
the movement in Court of Appeals reversal behavior that erased defendants’ prior 23-percentage 
point advantage came from cases in which defendants had persuaded the trial court to deny 
certification but the Court of Appeals found their position wanting. 
Our finding that plaintiffs and defendants secured reversal at an indistinguishable rate 
post-Comcast in all appeals (interlocutory and final-judgment) is in general accord with 
Professor Lammon’s conclusion, in his study covering 2013-17, that Courts of Appeals reversed 
 
79 Models E and F, Table A-1 (Appendix). 
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grants and denials at the same rate in Rule 23(f) appeals that reached the merits.  However, the 
radically different results for the pre-Comcast period highlight the dangers of ignoring time.  
Relative reversal rates across grants and denials changed dramatically over time and may well do 
so again in ways that we cannot now anticipate.  General inferences about who benefits from or 
is disadvantaged by the greater frequency of appellate review under Rule 23(f) are not warranted 
by our data.            
The answer appears to be quite contingent.  One factor that it is likely contingent on is the 
behavior of the parties and the way they respond to changes in the legal environment.  The 
overreach hypothesis proposed by Professor Klonoff suggests that, in the post-Wal-
Mart/Comcast period, defendants pressed weaker arguments both before district courts and on 
appeal, leading to an increasing plaintiff win rate.  Professor Marcus adds the possibility that in 
the same period plaintiffs’ lawyers elevated the quality of their advocacy for certification, 
leading to an increasing plaintiff win rate.  Another potential factor is that trial courts adopted a 
more anti-certification interpretation of Wal-Mart and Comcast than did the Courts of Appeals, 
increasing the plaintiff win rate.  These views, of course, are not mutually exclusive.  Our data 
are consistent with each and cannot adjudicate among them.  Perhaps ironically given advice on 
behalf of the Chamber of Commerce,80 Rule 23(f) was an important weapon that plaintiffs 
wielded to beat back some success that defendants enjoyed before trial courts in the aftermath of 
Wal-Mart and Comcast.81   
The possibility of these dynamics highlights another caution in our ability to draw the 
inference, from comparable win rates, that plaintiffs fare as well as defendants under Rule 23(f) 
in the post-Comcast period.  The arguments of Klonoff and Marcus suggest a more general point: 
the average quality of arguments presented by defendants versus plaintiffs may vary 
systematically over time in response to changes in the legal environment, such as changes in 
appellate law and legal strategy in the defense or plaintiffs’ bar.  This would confound the notion 
that comparable win rates mean that courts are being evenhanded as between plaintiffs and 
defendants.  If the defendant (plaintiff) side systematically presses weaker arguments and 
succeeds at the same rate as the plaintiff (defendant) side that is making stronger arguments, they 
are doing better, not the same.  Regrettably, this is but one instance of the more general problem 
that selection processes that generate the body of decided appeals, and the way they change over 
time, make win rates very difficult to interpret. 
 
80 See supra text accompanying note 34. 
81 In the post-Comcast period, of plaintiff appeals from district court denials of certification that 
were reversed, 53% were interlocutory.  We do not suggest that plaintiffs’ post-Comcast gains 






In the domain of precedential decisions, final-judgment appeals dominated interlocutory 
appeals prior to 2000.  The number of both published and unpublished decisions grew steeply in 
the wake of Rule 23(f), and interlocutory appeals contributed the lion’s share of this growth.  
However, interlocutory appeals have not come to dominate final-judgment appeals.  
Interlocutory and final-judgment appeals were in rough parity in the 2002-17 period.  After 
CAFA was passed in 2005, the number of decisions in cases seeking certification of state claims 
only also grew steeply.  Finally, we observed that final-judgment appeals in (b)(3) classes are far 
from aberrant -- they constitute a significant portion of all final-judgment appeals in 2002-17-- 
but that (b)(3) issues are materially more likely to appear in interlocutory appeals.   
Prior to Wal-Mart interlocutory appeals were far more frequently used to reverse grants 
of certification than to reverse denials.  After Wal-Mart the trend reversed, and by 2017 reversal 
rates were comparable for district court grants and denials of certification.  The picture looked 
broadly similar for final-judgment appeals.  The estimated probability of pro-certification 
outcomes grew steeply over about the last decade of our data, a period during which many 
commentators (often citing Wal-Mart and Comcast) have regarded the legal environment as 
hostile to certification.  Interestingly, after around 2010, increasingly pro-certification outcomes 
on Republican-majority panels contributed to this development, joining an already ongoing pro-
certification trend on Democratic-majority panels.  Statistical models show that, in the period 
during which both Wal-Mart and Comcast were governing law, the defendant advantage in 
achieving reversal disappeared, and there was a higher probability of pro-certification outcomes 
than before.   
Finally, we observed that in the mid- to late-1990s in published cases, and the early 
2000s in all cases, Democratic- and Republican-majority panels grew markedly more polarized 
on certification issues (measured as the distance between them), and this polarization was 
sustained even while both grew more pro-certification.  This temporal pattern of polarization is 
similar to what we found in earlier work on the Supreme Court in private enforcement cases in 
general and in Federal Rules cases in particular.  In the statistical models, we observe that party 
has a larger effect in interlocutory appeals (the gap between Democratic and Republican-
majority panels is larger), and thus the growing number of interlocutory appeals under Rule 23(f) 





 In all of the logistic models reported below, the following control variables were included: 
 
 TRIAL COURT OUTCOME: Indicator variable reflecting whether the trial court certified the 
class (or portion of the class) that is under consideration by the Court of Appeals. 
 TRIAL JUDGE SITTING BY DESIGNATION: Indicator variable recording whether there was a 
trial judge sitting by designation on the panel.82 
 DEFENDANT TYPE: Non-mutually exclusive indicator variables measuring whether 
certification was sought with respect to a federal defendant, state defendant, business 
defendant, or other type of defendant. 
 LAW TYPE: Mutually exclusive indicator variables measuring whether certification was 
sought for claims arising under federal law, state law, or both. 
 CLASS TYPE: Mutually exclusive indicator variables measuring whether certification 
was sought for a plaintiff class, a defendant class, or both. 
 POLICY AREA: Mutually exclusive indicator variables reflecting policy area. Our policy 
classifications are: civil rights-discrimination, civil rights-prisoner, civil rights-other, 
labor and employment, consumer, product liability, environmental and toxic 
substances, antitrust, securities, insurance, and public benefits. Remaining policy areas 
each comprised less than 2% of the data, and we aggregated them into an “other” policy 
category. 
 CERTIFICATION VERSUS DECERTIFICATION: Indicator variable recording whether the court 
was deciding a motion to certify or a motion to decertify. 
 CIRCUIT FIXED EFFECTS: Circuit fixed effects (dummy variables for each circuit) 
account for any time-varying covariates that take the same value for each judge on a 
panel within the circuit.  This controls for factors that vary across circuits that are 
associated with certification, such as circuit doctrine that may have a pro- or anti-
certification slant and variation in the size and content of caseloads across circuits.  
 PUBLICATION: Indicator variable in models of both published and unpublished decisions 
reflecting whether a decision is precedential.    
 GENDER COMPOSITION: Indicator variables measuring where there were one, two, or 
three women serving on the panel.83   
 RACIAL COMPOSITION: Indicator variables measuring where there were one or two 





 82. We say “trial judge” rather than district judge because judges from the Court of Claims and 
the International Court of Trade also sit by designation. 
 
 83 We obtained this information from Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 
1789-Present, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.cc/8HHF-JYZ9]. 
 




Coefficients in logit models cannot be directly interpreted, and thus it is necessary to 
compute predicted changes in probability of outcomes associated with a change in levels or 
categories of independent variables (such as the change from pre- to post-Comcast).  The 
predicted probabilities discussed in the paper are derived from the models in Table A-1.  Model 
A (1967-2017, published cases) and Model B (2002-17, all cases) in Table A-1 present the basic 
models of pro-certification outcomes with only the main effects of the independent variables of 
interest.  In these models, the independent variables capture the average relationship between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable over the period covered by the model, 
conditional on other covariates.  
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All models include circuit fixed effects, policy area fixed effects, and independent variables 
measuring direction of the trial court outcome, trial judge sitting by designation, defendant type 
(federal government, state government, business, other), law type (federal law, state law, both), type 
of class for which certification was sought (plaintiff, defendant, both), whether the motion was for 
certification or decertification, and dummy variables measuring whether there were one, two, or three 
women serving on the panel, and whether there were one or two African Americans serving on the 
panel. Models B, D, and F additionally contain a variable indicating whether the case was published. 
N= 1095 586 1095 586 1012 531 
Pseudo 
R2= 
.12 .19 .13 .20 .10 .19 






In Models C to F, the focus is on interactions of independent variables, such as the 
interaction of interlocutory and Democratic-majority.  We discuss the predicted probabilities 
associated with the significant interactions of interest in the body of the paper.  While we do not 
discuss the main effects of the interacted variables, we note that their meaning changes very 
significantly relative to their meaning without the interaction.  For example, in models with the 
interlocutory variable interacted with Democratic-majority, the interlocutory variable no longer 
captures the average effect of interlocutory, but rather captures only the effect of an appeal being 
interlocutory (interlocutory=1) when the panel is majority Republican (Democratic-majority=0), 
with the reference category being final-judgment appeals (interlocutory=0) decided by 
Republican majorities (Democratic-majority=0).   
Models C and D replicate Models A and B, but with the addition of the interaction of 
interlocutory with Democratic-majority, and the interaction of post-Comcast with Democratic-
majority.  Models E and F then substitute reversal as the dependent variable.  The significant 
interaction of interlocutory and Democratic-majority is retained, and the insignificant interaction 
of Comcast and Democratic-majority is dropped.   
We include in our data certification decisions of settlement-only classes (which comprise 
3.9% of our cases).  It is arguable that when plaintiff-objectors are challenging matters on which 
named plaintiffs and defendants agree, the appeal does not present a question that can be 
appropriately described as pro or anti-certification.  Our approach to the data is to include all 
certification questions rather than selecting cases out of the data based on our expectations about 
how they will align with judicial preferences on certification.  Nevertheless, we examined 
alternative specifications of Models A to D (which have pro- versus anti-certification as the 
dependent variable) that included an independent variable measuring whether the appeal was by 
a plaintiff-objector.  The variable was insignificant in every model, the independent variables 
displayed for each model in Table A-1 remained within the same significance levels, and the 
significant variables were associated with very similar magnitudes.  Plaintiff-objectors are not 
affecting our results.  In Models E and F (which have reversal as the dependent variable) we 
restrict analysis to appeals brought only by plaintiffs (not including objectors), or only by 
defendants, because that is called for by the hypotheses being tested in those models.    
